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The sudden explosion of corporate accounting scandals and re-
lated financial irregularities that burst over the financial markets be-
tween late 2001 and the first half of 2002-Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Adelphia and others-raises an obvious question: Why now? What ex-
plains the concentration of financial scandals at this moment in time?
Much commentary has rounded up the usual suspects and placed the
blame on a decline in business morality,' an increase in "infectious
t Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
1 See William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 Bus. LAw. 961, 962-63 (2003) ("The
problem is that corporate and legal culture has lost all sense of right and wrong."). I hope
that Professor Widen has overstated the matter, but I cannot prove him wrong.
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greed," 2 or other similarly subjective trends that cannot be reliably
measured. Although none of these possibilities can be dismissed out
of hand, approaches that simply reason backwards, proceeding from
the observation that the number of scandals has increased to the con-
clusion that a decline in business morality has therefore occurred,
merely assume what is to be proven.
Alternatively, others have blamed these scandals either on a few
"rogue" managers who somehow fooled the capital markets, or on
negligent, inattentive boards of directors.3 No doubt, there were
some rogues and some particularly bad boards. Yet the most reliable
evidence, when properly read, suggests that Enron and related scan-
dals were neither unique nor idiosyncratic; rather, pervasive problems
arose that undercut existing systems of corporate governance. Thus, a
focus on the deficiencies of any individual board of directors cannot
explain the sudden surge of governance failures. As no plausible the-
ory suggests that board performance has generally deteriorated over
recent years, one must look beyond the board, in particular to those
who provide or control its informational inputs, to explain this con-
centration of scandals.
Still another unsatisfactory response to the concentration of re-
cent scandals has been to posit that a wave of recriminations, soul-
searching, and scapegoating necessarily follows the collapse of any
market bubble. 4 Clearly, a large frothy bubble did burst in 2001. 5 As
a historical matter, bubbles do tend to produce scandals and prophy-
2 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan coined this colorful phrase, observing
that: "'An infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business community.'" See Floyd
Norris, Yes, He Can Top That, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at Al.
3 Although some boards certainly did fail, this explanation again seems intellectually
unsatisfactory. Admittedly, a special committee of Enron's own board has concluded that
the Enron board failed to monitor adequately officers or conflicts of interest. See WILIAM
C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 148-77 (2002), 2002 WL 198018. A Senate
subcommittee has similarly assigned the principal blame to the Enron board. See PERMA-
NENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70, at
59 (2002). Nonetheless, such studies beg the larger question: Why did these boards fail
now and not earlier?
4 See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (2003) (blaming
recent scandals on the latest turn in a "centuries-old cycle of capital market booms fol-
lowed by busts and regulation").
5 Revealingly, the stock market bubble of the late 1990s burst in two stages, first in
2001 with the demise of the internet related stocks (the "dot-com" bubble) and then again
in the late spring of 2002 as WorldCom and other crises further shook market confidence.
The S&P 500 index fell 31% .between the beginning of 2002 and July 23, 2002. See E.S.
Browning, Nasdaq Stocks Sustain Biggest Loss of Year, TALL ST. J., July 24, 2002, at C1. The
DowJones Average similarly hit its low for the periodJanuary 1, 1998 toJanuary 1, 2003, on
October 9, 2002, when it closed at 7286.27. See E.S. Browning, Bears Claw Markets Yet Again,
as Dow Industrials Fall Nearly 3 %, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2002, at Al (noting that 7286.27 was
the DowJones's lowest finish since October 27, 1997). This low point was after the passage
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lactic legislation,6 but this loose generalization leaves unanswered the
critical questions: What caused this bubble and how does the growth
of a bubble relate to the apparent breakdown of a once-confident sys-
tem of corporate governance?
This Article seeks to move beyond the "few bad apples" or "rogue
managers" explanation, or the cynical assumption that scandals are
inevitable and cyclical, to identify common denominators across the
range of recent cases. Although this Article does not seek to explain
what happened in any individual case (including Enron) or to genera-
lize from any specific case to reach broader conclusions about corpo-
rate governance, it does suggest that the explosion of financial
irregularity in 2001 and 2002 was the natural and logical consequence
of trends and forces that had been developing for some time. Ironi-
cally, the blunt truth is that recent accounting scandals and the
broader phenomenon of earnings management are by-products of a
system of corporate governance that has indeed made corporate man-
agers more accountable to the market. Yet sensitivity to the market
can be a mixed blessing, particularly when the market becomes eu-
phoric and uncritical. To the extent that the market becomes the
master, governance systems that were adequate for a world in which
market focuses were weaker need to be upgraded in tandem with mar-
ket developments to protect against manipulation and distortion by
self-interested managers. This, in turn, takes us back to the central
role of gatekeepers.
Above all, the fundamental developments that destabilized our
contemporary corporate governance system were those that changed
the incentives confronting both senior executives and the corpora-
tion's outside gatekeepers. In contrast, little reason exists to believe
that the behavior of boards deteriorated over recent years. Thus, a
focus on gatekeepers and managers provides a better perspective for
analyzing both what caused these scandals and the likely impact of the
recent congressional legislation passed in their wake.7 Accordingly,
this Article will initially relate the recent scandals to changes in mana-
gerial and gatekeeper compensation over the last two decades. Yet,
although the incentives of managers and gatekeepers clearly changed
over the 1990s because of exogenous changes in legal rules and mar-
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in late July of 2002, suggesting that that law alone did not return
investor confidence.
6 Professor Stuart Banner has argued that, over the last three hundred years, most
major instances of legislation regulating the securities markets have followed a sustained
price collapse on the securities market. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regula-
tion? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997).
7 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (stating that this
is "[an act to] protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate dis-
closures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes").
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ket conditions, this is not the entire story. Bubbles-here defined to
mean a state of market euphoria in which investors lose their normal
skepticism-also change the behavior of gatekeepers, managers, and
shareholders. To some degree, responsibility must be allocated
among three different groups: (1) gatekeepers; (2) managers; and (3)
shareholders, particularly institutional investors. Initially, this Article
will focus on the special institution of corporate gatekeepers (on
whom it argues modern corporate governance depends) and how
their behavior may logically change during a bubble. Then, it will
turn to managers and shareholders. This Article's conclusions have
policy implications and in particular provide a perspective on the
likely impact of Congress's efforts to address these recent scandals in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
I
THE PRIOR EQUILIBRIUM: AMERICAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AS OF 1980
The world of corporate governance changed quickly and radi-
cally during the final two decades of the last century. If one turned
back the clock to before 1980, one would find that the dominant aca-
demic commentary on the corporation of the pre-1980 era articulated
a "theory of managerial capitalism" that essentially saw the public cor-
poration as a kind of bloated bureaucracy that maximized sales,
growth, and size, but not profits or stock price.8 Academic writers
such as Robin Marris and William Baumol viewed the firms of that era
as pursuing an empire-building policy, which "profit satisfied," rather
than profit maximized. 9 Professional managers balanced the interests
of different constituencies and, at least according to some commenta-
tors, assigned no special priority to the interests of shareholders. Such
a management strategy was motivated in large part by the desire of the
corporation's managers to increase their own security and perqui-
sites. 10 Conglomerate mergers, for example, achieved these self-inter-
ested ends by reducing the risk of insolvency, thereby protecting
senior managers by providing them with a diversified but largely unre-
lated portfolio of businesses that could cross-subsidize each other and
8 See e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (2d ed. Har-
court, Brace & World, Inc. 1967) (discussing oligopoly theory and the theory of economic
development); ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM (1967)
(discussing managerial capitalism and proposing an internal theory of the firm); see also
Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032,
1055 (1963) (suggesting that either corporations are operated according to a managerial,
utility-maximizing model "or, if 'actual' profits are maximized, that reported profits are
reduced by absorbing some fraction of actual profits in executive salaries and [a variety of
perquisites]").
9 See BAUMOL, supra note 8, passim; MARRis, supra note 8, passim.
10 See Williamson, supra note 8, at 1055.
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thereby mitigate the impact of the business cycle. "1 Also, with greater
size came greater cash income to managers and a reduced risk of cor-
porate control contests or shareholder activism.
Some academic writers in this era-most notably Oliver William-
son-did not view the conglomerate as necessarily inefficient; rather,
Williamson argued that internal capital markets could be as efficient
as external ones. 12 Still, both sides in this debate concurred that man-
agers were effectively insulated from shareholder demands and could
treat shareholders as just one of several constituencies whose interests
were to be "balanced."'13 Some criticized, while others defended, this
lack of accountability, but few denied that managers possessed broad
discretion in how they ran the business corporation.
During the 1980s, the advent of the hostile takeover profoundly
destabilized this equilibrium. While hostile takeovers predated the
1980s, it was only during that decade, beginning in 1983,14 that they
first began to be financed with junk bonds. Junk bond financing
made the conglomerate corporate empires of the prior decade vulner-
able and tempting targets for the financial bidder, who could reap
high profits in a bust-up takeover.' 5 In turn, this gave managers of
potential targets a stronger interest than they had in the past in their
firm's short-term stock price because, despite the availability of defen-
sive tactics, a target firm could seldom remain independent if its mar-
ket price fell significantly below its breakup value for a sustained
period.
Less noticed at the time, but possibly even more significant from
today's perspective, was the change in the nature of executive com-
pensation. Leveraged buyout firms, such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts,
entered the takeover wars, seeking to buy undervalued companies,
11 See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomer-
ate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 605-06 (1981); Alan J. Marcus, Risk Sharing and the Theory
of the Firm, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 369, 370 (1982); see alsoJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28-31 (1986) (providing an
overview of the managerialist model of the firm).
12 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTFITRUST IM-
PLICATIONS 158-59 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes, 19J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1557-58 (1981) [hereinafter Williamson, The Mod-
em Corporation].
13 See, e.g., Williamson, The Modern Corporation, supra note 12, at 1559 (noting the "evi-
dent disparity of interest between managers and stockholders").
14 The Congressional Research Service identified the year 1983 as the first occasion
on which "junk bonds" were used to finance hostile takeovers. See CONG. RESEARCH SER-
VICE, 99th CONG., THE ROLE OF HIGH YIELD BONDS [JUNK BONDS] IN CAPITAL MARKETS AND
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 23 (Comm. Print 1985).
15 See Coffee, supra note 11, at 2-7 (arguing that the characteristic pattern of take-
overs began to shift in the early 1980s from synergistic acquisitions to bust-up takeovers);
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakehold-
ers and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 444.
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often in league with these firms' incumbent management. Alterna-
tively, they sometimes installed new management teams to turn the
company around. Either way, the goal of the leveraged buyout firms
was to create strong incentives that would link management's interest
to the firm's stock market value. Thus, firms began compensating se-
nior managers with much greater ownership stakes than had customa-
rily been awarded in the past.
Ironically, the principal actors who destabilized the existing cor-
porate equilibrium were institutional investors and Congress. Institu-
tional investors encouraged greater use of stock options to
compensate both managers and directors in order to increase their
sensitivity to the market.1 6 Congress unintentionally hastened this
process by placing a ceiling on the cash compensation that senior ex-
ecutives could be paid. First, in 1984, Congress levied a punitive ex-
cise tax on "excess parachute payments" in order to discourage
"windfall" compensation paid in connection with change of control
transactions. 17 Then, in 1993, Congress enacted § 162(m) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, which basically denies a tax deduction to a pub-
licly held corporation for annual compensation paid to its chief
executive officer, or to any of the next four most highly paid officers,
where the amount paid to any such individual officer exceeds $1 mil-
lion.18 Predictably, once restricted in the cash compensation they
16 See Amy L. Goodman, The Fuss Over Executive Compensation, 6 INSIGHTS No. 1, at 2
(Jan. 1992) (noting that a survey of institutional investors conducted at the 1991 United
Shareholder Association Conference revealed that such investors wanted executive com-
pensation to be performance-based and to reflect management's accountability for com-
pany performance).
17 Concerned that target company executives were receiving unjustified "windfall"
compensation in connection with "golden parachute" arrangements, Congress enacted the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which added §§ 280G and 4999 to the Internal Revenue
Code. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (2000)) (providing that the corporation could not
take a deduction for any "excess parachute payment," 26 U.S.C. § 280G(a), and levying a
20% nondeductible excise tax on any executive who received such a payment, id.
§ 4999(a)). Parachute payments consisted of compensation contingent on a change in
corporate control, and "excess" payments subject to disfavorable tax treatment were those
that exceeded three times the executive's average taxable compensation from the corpora-
tinn over the past five years. See id. § 280G(b). Hence, if the corporation paid the execu-
tive an average compensation of $600,000 over that period, any payment in excess of
$1,800,000, which was contingent on a change in control, would be subject to this special
excise tax. For a more detailed explanation of the mechanics of this tax, see Bruce A.
Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repealt?, 21 VA. TAX REv. 125, 129-134
(2001).
18 See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m). Two exceptions to this prophylactic rule are: (1) commis-
sions, such as those from sales that are paid for income generated by the individual, and
(2) performance-based compensation based on performance goals established by outside
directors and approved by a majority of the shareholders. See id. §§ 162(m) (4) (B)-(C).
Stock options fall within the second exemption. See James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax
Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 708 (1997). The
effect of this provision was not to impose an aboslute ceiling, because some firms decided
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could pay, corporate planners shifted to greater use of equity compen-
sation, where fewer prophylactic rules governed. 19 Although this shift
towards equity compensation accelerated in the 1990s, it began in the
1980s as a by-product of the takeover movement.
II
THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH: THE NEW GOVERNANCE
PARADIGM OF THE 1990s
The two principal forces that initially changed American corpo-
rate governance over the 1990s have already been identified: the take-
over movement and the growing use of equity compensation. Other
forces that crested during the 1990s-including the heightened activ-
ism of institutional investors, a deregulatory movement that sought to
dismantle arguably obsolete regulatory provisions, and the media's in-
creasing fascination with the market as the 1990s progressed-rein-
forced the impact of the initial forces as each made managers more
sensitive to their firm's market price. In so doing, however, these
forces also induced managers to take greater risks to inflate their stock
price.
The dimensions of this transition are best revealed if we contrast
compensation data from the early 1990s with that from a decade or so
later. As of 1990, equity-based compensation for chief executive of-
ficers of public corporations in the United States constituted approxi-
mately five percent of their total annual compensation; by 1999, this
percentage had risen to an estimated sixty, percent.20 Moreover, be-
tween 1992 and 1998, the median compensation of Standard and
Poor's (S&P) 500 chief executives increased by approximately 150%,
with option-based compensation accounting for most of this in-
crease.2' The critical point is that in the 1990s, senior executive com-
pensation shifted from being primarily cash-based to primarily stock-
based. With this change, management's focus shifted from the rela-
tionship between the firm's market price and the firm's break-up
to forego deductions in order to pay higher compensation to their executives. SeeJoann S.
Lublin, Firms Forfeit Tax Break to Pay Top Brass $1 Million-Plus, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at
BI.
19 See generally Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency
Costs, 35 Hous. L. REV. 399 (1988) (investigating the consequences of the use of equity
derivatives in pay-for-performance arrangements).
20 See Daniel Altman, How to Tie Pay to Goals, Instead of the Stock Price, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
8, 2002, § 3 (Business), at 4 (citing data collected by Harvard Business School Professor
Brian J. Hall). Professor Hall in fact finds that the median equity-based compensation of
top U.S. executives at S&P 500 industrial companies rose from 0% in 1984 to 8% in 1990,
and to 66% in 2001. See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in DesigningEquity-Based Pay, 15 ACCEN-
TUREJ. APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 21, 23 (2003).
21 See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment
or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 145 (2000).
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value, which the advent of the bust-up takeover compelled them to
watch, to the likely future performance of their firm's stock over the
short run. Far more than the hostile takeover, equity compensation
induced management to obsess over their firm's day-to-day share
price.
Not only did market practices change during the 1990s, but der-
egulation facilitated both the use of equity compensation and the abil-
ity of managers to bail out at an inflated stock price. Prior to 1991,
§ 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required a senior exec-
utive of a publicly held company to hold the underlying security for
six months after the exercise of a stock option.22 Otherwise, § 16(b)
compelled the executive to surrender any gain from sale to the corpo-
ration as a "short swing" profit.23 In 1991, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) reexamined its rules under § 16(b) and
broadly deregulated. 24 In particular, the SEC relaxed the holding pe-
riod requirements under § 16(b) so that the senior executive could
tack the holding period of the stock option to the holding period for
the underlying shares.. Thus, if the stock option had already been
held six months or longer, the underlying shares could be sold imme-
diately upon exercise of the option. As qualified stock options by
their terms usually must be held several years before they become ex-
ercisable, this revision meant that most senior executives were free to
sell the underlying stock on the same day that they exercised the op-
tion; thus, they could exploit a temporary spike in the price of the
firm's shares. This quickly became the prevailing pattern. Although it
was not the goal of deregulation to encourage bailouts, this was an
unintended consequence that might have been foreseen.
Even prior to the 1990s, earnings management was a pervasive
and longstanding practice. 25 Its goal, however, had traditionally been
to smooth out fluctuations in income in order to reduce the volatility
of the firm's cash flows and present a simple, steadily ascending line
from period to period.26 Thus, management perfected techniques
such as "cookie jar reserves" to save earnings for a rainy day.27 During
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
23 See id.
24 See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-28869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242 (Feb. 21, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Ownership Reports] (codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 229, 240, 249, 270, 274) (adopting re-
vised Rule 16b-3(d)(3), which permits an officer or director to combine the two holding
periods).
25 See Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game," Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and
Business (Sept. 28, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/
spch220.txt (noting that "the problem of earnings management is not new").
26 See id. (discussing management's "zeal to . . .project a smooth earnings path").
27 See id. (suggesting that "companies try to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projec-
tions in order to grow market capitalization and increase the value of stock options").
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the 1990s, however, the nature of earnings -management changed,
with managers shifting their focus from moderating earnings swings
to advancing the moment of revenue recognition. 28 Accounting scan-
dals rose commensurate with this shift toward premature
recognition. 29
At least in part, the increased willingness of managers to recog-
nize income prematurely-in effect, to misappropriate it from future
periods-appears linked to the need to satisfy the forecasts of security
analysts covering the firm. By the mid-1990s, even a modest shortfall
in earnings below the level forecasted could produce a dramatic mar-
ket penalty as dissatisfied investors dumped the firm's stock.30 Yet one
must face a circularity problem before blaming earnings management
failures on management's fear of a market overreaction to a modest
shortfall below predicted earnings. Typically, the security analyst's
chief source of information about the company is its senior manage-
ment. If management doubted its ability to meet the analyst's projec-
tion, why did it not encourage the analyst to make a less aggressive
forecast in the first instance? The most logical answer again involves
the growing importance of equity compensation. Aggressive forecasts
drove the firm's stock price up and enabled management to sell at an
inflated price. Premature revenue recognition then became a means
28 The best evidence of this shift is that the leading cause of financial statement re-
statements in the late 1990s was revenue recognition errors. The General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) has found that 39% (by far the largest category) of the financial restatements
between 1997 and 2002 were the consequence of revenue recognition errors. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. 03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MAR-
KET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 5 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. For a brief review of
recent accounting scandals, which have been numerous, see Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadow, 57 Bus. LAw. 1421,
1423-30 (2002).
29 A 2001 article in the Wall Street Journal estimated that more than half of all account-
ing lawsuits involved "'premature revenue recognition.'" See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Ac-
counting For Wien Dreams Become Reality, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2001, at A21. Other experts,
including both scholars and practitioners, have identified premature revenue recognition
as one of the most common accounting frauds and have attributed its new prevalence to
the widespread use of equity compensation. See Daniel V. Dooley, Financial Fraud: Account-
ing Theory and Practice, 8 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 53, 58-59, 63-66 (2002); Manning G.
Warren III, Revenue Recognition and Corporate Counsel, 56 S.M.U. L. REv. 885 (2003). In late
1999, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,936 (Dec. 9, 1999)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211), which attempted to control some of the more recent abuses
of revenue recognition.
30 For the suggestion that management became obsessed with maximizing earnings in
the 1990s, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Rflections, 69 U. Cr. L. REv. 1233, 1244-47 (2002)
(noting the "obvious" temptations where relatively small changes in earnings have signifi-
cant impact on the stock price, particularly where management receives a portion of its
compensation through stock options).
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by which managers satisfied aggressive forecasts that they had them-
selves encouraged in order to achieve high market valuations.
High market valuations were not, however, simply the product of
aggressive forecasting. Beginning in 1995 and continuing until March
2000, the stock market in the United States entered its longest, most
sustained bull market in U.S. history. 31 In such an excited environ-
ment, aggressive forecasting produces a predictable market reaction.
Moreover, in a bubble, investors, analysts, auditors, and other gate-
keepers may relax their usual skepticism amidst the market euphoria
that a sustained bull market generates.
Accounting scandals have had a long history over the last half-
century.32 Viewed from a distance, Enron and the related scandals of
2001 and 2002 are probably most comparable to the Savings and Loan
(S&L) crisis of the late 1980s, an episode that similarly resulted in
draconian legislation. 33 Both episodes reveal that perverse manage-
rial incentives were the driving force behind managers' acceptance of
high risks on behalf of their firms that they did not fully bear them-
selves. After the S&L crisis, investigators quickly identified a classic
"moral hazard" problem. Because the government guaranteed banks'
financial obligations to depositors, these depositors had little reason
to monitor management, and accordingly bank promoters were able
to leverage their firms excessively. In the case of the Enron-era scan-
dals, the impact of executive stock compensation may have played a
similar explanatory role. This comparison leads to a tentative general-
ization: Perverse incentives, not declines in ethics, cause scandals.3 4
Still, an alternative hypothesis also remains plausible. Namely,
that a market bubble better explains the failure of those monitors who
should have restrained management. Because both explanations can
31 On January 1, 1995, the Dow Jones Average stood at 3,838.48, up only modestly
from the 3,756.60 figure at which it stood on January 1, 1994. See http://djindexes.com/
downloads/xlspages/DJIAHistPerf.xls (on file with Cornell Law Review). During 1995,
it rose 33.45%, and by January 1, 2002, it had reached 10,073.40, peaking on March 19,
2002 at an all-time high of 10,635.25. See id. It fell that year to a low of 7,286.27 on Octo-
ber 9, 2002 and closed at 8,341.63, for a net decline in 2002, the year of Enron's bank-
ruptcy, of 16.76%. See id.
32 For a review of recent accounting scandals, see Cunningham, supra note 28, at
1423-30.
33 The S&L crisis led directly to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), which imposes
high fiduciary standards on directors of thrift and savings and loan institutions. See id.
§ 901-920, 103 Stat. at 446-88. FIRREA also created a new regulatory body: the Resolution
Funding Corporation. See id. § 511, 103 Stat. at 394-406.
34 Although one could argue that a decline in ethics occurred, at least within the S&L
industry, during the 1980s, economic misincentives better explain that scandal, the ac-
counting irregularities scandals of the 1990s, the securities analyst crisis of 2002, and the
current controversy involving mutual funds. Indeed, commentators have so overused the
concept of ethical decline that it has lost much of its meaning and now seems merely a post
hoc rationalization.
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account for the pervasive gatekeeper failures that have accompanied
recent financial and accounting scandals, a synthesig seems necessary.
Such a synthesis requires, however, that we focus more closely on what
defines and motivates the professional gatekeeper.
III
THE CHANGING POSITION OF THE GATEKEEPER
DURING THE 1990s
Although commentators often use the term gatekeeper,3 5 its
meaning is not self-evident. As used in this article, the term refers to
intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to
investors. 36 These services may include verifying a company's finan-
cial statements (as the independent auditor does), evaluating the
creditworthiness of the company (as the debt rating agency does), as-
sessing the company's business and financial prospects vis-A-vis its ri-
vals (as the securities analyst does), or appraising the fairness of a
specific transaction (as the investment banker does in delivering a
fairness opinion). Attorneys may also act as gatekeepers when they
pledge their professional reputations to a transaction, as the counsel
for the issuer typically does in delivering its opinion in connection
with an initial public offering.3 7 However, as later discussed, the more
typical role of attorneys serving public corporations is that of the
transaction engineer, rather than that of a reputational intermediary.
Thus, the auditor and the attorney are located at the opposite poles of
35 The term gatekeeper is not simply an academic concept. For example, the SEC
recently noted that "[t] he federal securities laws ... make independent auditors 'gatekeep-
ers' to the public securities markets." See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Indepen-
dence Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7870, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148, 43,150 (July
12, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
36 For a fuller, more theoretical consideration of the concept of the gatekeeper, see
generally Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916 (1998) (dis-
cussing the function of intermediary gatekeepers in different markets and how market
failures lead to a decline in gatekeepers); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (discussing liability rules as a means to
induce corporate participants to control corporate wrongdoing); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986)
(examining liability imposed on private party gatekeepers who "disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers").
37 Today, in most public, underwritten offerings of securities, issuer's counsel delivers
an opinion to the underwriters-typically called a "negative assurance" opinion-stating
that it is not aware of any material information required to be disclosed that has not been
disclosed. See Richard R. Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in Rendering Legal Opin-
ions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 283, 287. Such opinions are not truly legal opinions in that
they do not truly state any legal conclusion, but rather pledge the lawyer's reputational
capital to assure the underwriters that adverse material information is not being hidden by
the issuer. In this sense, the lawyer functions as a gatekeeper, pledging his reputational
capital and accepting the risk of liability if he has recklessly misstated. See also John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1313
(2003) (discussing "negative assurance" opinions).
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a continuum: each can act as a reputational intermediary, but the
attorney tends to function as the engineer and the auditor more often
as the certifier or reputational intermediary.
Characteristically, the professional gatekeeper assesses or vouches
for the corporate client's own statements about itself or a specific
transaction. This duplication is efficient because the market recog-
nizes that the gatekeeper has less incentive to deceive than does its
client and thus regards the gatekeeper's assurance or evaluation as
more credible than the client's statements. To be sure, the gate-
keeper's role as watchdog is arguably compromised by the fact that it
is typically paid by the party that it is supposed to monitor. Still, the
gatekeeper's relative credibility stems from the fact that it is, in effect,
pledging reputational capital that it has built up over many years of
performing similar services for numerous clients. In theory, a gate-
keeper would not sacrifice such reputational capital for a single client
or a modest fee. Nonetheless, here as elsewhere, logic and experience
conflict: Despite the seemingly clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale,
experience during the 1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers
will acquiesce in managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputa-
tional losses would seem to dwarf the gains to be made from an indi-
vidual client.38 In this light, the deeper question underlying Enron
and related scandals is not: Why did some managers engage in fraud?
Rather, it is: Why did the gatekeepers let them?
Initially, the gatekeeper's reasons for resisting fraud and not ac-
quiescing in accounting irregularities seem obvious. In theory, a gate-
keeper generally has many clients, each of whom pays it a fee, which is
modest in proportion to the firm's overall revenues. Arthur Andersen
had, for example, 2,300 separate audit clients. 39 On this basis, the
firm had little incentive to risk its considerable reputational capital for
any one of them.
During the 1990s, many courts wholeheartedly subscribed to this
logic. For example, in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,40 Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, outlined precisely the foregoing
theory:
The complaint does not allege that [the auditor] had anything to
gain from any fraud by [its client]. An accountant's greatest asset is
its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for care-
ful work. Fees for two years' audits could not approach the losses
38 This observation hardly originated with this author. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice,
The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U.
L. Rrv. 133 (2000) (applying a behavioral analysis to securities fraud and challenging tradi-
tional rational actor assumptions).
39 See Michelle Mittelstadt, Andersen Indicted in Enron Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Mar. 15, 2002, at IA.
40 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990).
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[that the auditor] would suffer from a perception that it would muf-
fle a client's fraud .... [The auditor's] partners shared none of the
gain from any fraud and were exposed to a large fraction of the loss.
It would have been irrational for any of them to have joined cause
with [the client]. 4 1
Of course, the modest fees in some cases were much less than the
$100 million in prospective annual fees that Arthur Andersen explic-
itly foresaw coming from Enron. 42 Yet, this difference in fees fails to
explain Arthur Andersen's apparent willingness to accept high risk.
Even if Arthur Andersen saw Enron as a potential $100 million client,
it must be remembered that Arthur Andersen generated over $9 bil-
lion in revenues in 2001 alone and thus its expected Enron revenues
would total only around one percent of its aggregate revenues. 43
Hence, a fuller explanation seems necessary to understand gatekeeper
failure.
A. The Auditing Profession During the 1990s
Once among the most respected of all professional service firms
(including law, accounting, and consulting firms), Andersen became
involved in a series of now well-known securities frauds-Waste Man-
agement, Inc., Sunbeam, McKesson HBOC, Inc., Baptist Foundation
of Arizona, and Global Crossing-that culminated in its disastrous as-
sociation with Enron.4 4 Those who wish to characterize the recent
corporate scandals as simply the work of a few "bad apples," naturally
wish to present Arthur Andersen as an outlier or "outlaw" firm unrep-
resentative of the profession. This theory, however, simply cannot be
supported with objective data. The available evidence on the overall
41 Id. at 629; see also Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient motive for an accounting firm to engage in
securities fraud and stating that earning two years' fees from one client would not establish
such motivation); Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990) (find-
ing that a mere $90,000 annual audit fee would have been an irrational motive to commit
fraud).
42 See, e.g., Robin, 915 F.2d at 1127 (involving $90,000 in annual audit fees).
43 Arthur Andersen's total revenues for its fiscal year ended August 31, 2001 were $9.3
billion. See Melissa Klein, Guilty Verdict Draws Mixed Reactions: Profession Mulls Post-Andersen
Future, AccoUNTING TODAY, July 8, 2002, at 1. In a February 6, 2001 email to David
Duncan, the principal Enron audit partner for Arthur Andersen, from Michael Jones, an-
other Arthur Andersen partner in Houston, the latter notes that the Enron audit team at
Arthur Andersen believes "that it would not be unforeseeable that fees could reach a $100
million per year amount considering the multi-disciplinary services being provided" by An-
dersen to Enron (copy on file with Cornell Law Review). Even on this basis, however, the
prospective fees from Enron to Arthur Andersen would come to just over 1% of its $9.3
billion revenues in that year.
44 See e.g., Elizabeth Douglass & Tim Rutten, Accounting Worried Global Crossing Exec,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A1; Mark Watts, Numbers Don't Add up for BigFive Group of Bean
Counters, SUNDAY ExPREss, Mar. 24, 2002, at P6.
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experiences of the Big Five 45 accounting firms suggests that Andersen
was not significantly different from its peers and experienced the
same, or even a lesser, rate of earnings restatements. 46 All in all, the
more logical inference to draw from the "accounting irregularity"
scandals of 2001 and 2002 is that erosion occurred during the 1990s
in the quality of financial reporting.
Indeed, this is the area where the data is the clearest. During the
1990s, earnings restatements, long recognized as a proxy for fraud,
suddenly soared. One study, conducted in 2001 by George Moriarty
and Philip Livingston, found that the number of earnings restate-
ments issued by publicly held corporations averaged forty-nine per
year from 1990 to 1997, increased to ninety-one in 1998, and then
skyrocketed to 150 and 156 in 1999 and 2000, respectively. 47 A later,
more complete study conducted by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) in October 2002 examined all financial statement restate-
ments (not just earnings restatements) and found a similarly sharp
spike in 1999 that has continued through 2002.48 A table from the
GAO Report displays this trend:49
45 The Big Five firms were Arthur Andersen LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst &
Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. See In re IKON Office Solu-
tions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 662 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002).
46 Compared to its peers within the Big Five accounting firms, Arthur Andersen ap-
pears to have been responsible for less than its proportionate share of earnings restate-
ments. While it audited 21% of Big Five audit clients, it was responsible for only 15% of
the restatements issued by Big Five firms between 1997 and 2001. See Allan Sloan, Periscope:
How Arthur Andersen Begs for Business, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 2002, at 6. On this basis, it was
arguably more conservative than its peers. Industry insiders have characterized Andersen
as different from its peers only in that it marketed itself as a firm in which the audit partner
could make the final call on difficult accounting questions without having to secure ap-
proval from senior officials at Andersen. Although this could indicate a weaker system of
internal controls, that hypothesis seems inconsistent with Arthur Andersen's proportion-
ately low rate of earnings restatements.
47 See George B. Moriarty & Philip B. Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of
Financial Reporting, FIN. EXECUTIVE, July/Aug. 2001, at 53, 54.
48 See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 4-5, 15-16.
49 Id. at 15.
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FIGURE 1: TOTAL NUMBER OF RESTATEMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS
IDENTIFIED, 1997-2002
Number
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When we compare Moriarty and Livingston's figure of forty-nine
restatements in 1996 with the GAO's estimate of 250 for 2002, it shows
that the number of restatements increased by approximately 270 per-
cent over the five years ending in 2002.50
Not all restatements, however, are equal. Some may involve
small, infrequently traded companies, or involve only trivial account-
ing adjustments, or trigger only modest stock price reactions. Others
may be on a scale with those issued by Enron or WorldCom. For our
purposes, it is useful to focus more precisely on financial restatements
issued by companies listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq, thereby
excluding smaller companies with limited trading. Between 1997 and
2001, the proportion of NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq companies that re-
stated their financial statements almost tripled, increasing from less
than 0.89 percent in 1997 to approximately 2.5 percent in 2001.51
The GAO Report further predicted that the number of restating com-
panies would reach nearly three percent in 2002.52 Overall, the GAO
Report found that from January 1997 to June 2002, approximately
5o This comparison does slightly mix apples and oranges, as Moriarty and Livingston
include only earnings statement restatements, while the GAO Report focuses more broadly
on all financial statement restatements. Compare Moriarty & Livingston, supra note 47 (dis-
cussing only earnings statement restatements), with GAO REPORT, supra note 28 (examin-
ing financial restatements broadly). The differences are, however, likely to be modest
because the vast majority of financial restatements involve earnings restatements.
51 See GAO REPORT, supra note 28, at 4.
52 See id.
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"[ten] percent of all listed companies announced at least one restate-
ment."53 Equally revealing was that the size (in terms of market capi-
talization) of the typical restating company rose rapidly over this
period,54 and in 2002, companies listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq ac-
counted for over eighty-five percent of all restatements identified in
that year. 55
What drove this sudden spike in restatements? Restatements are
generally resisted internally because public corporations fear stock
price drops, securities class actions, and SEC investigations that usu-
ally follow in the wake of financial statement restatements. Indeed,
the GAO Report found that stock prices of restating companies over
the 1997 to 2001 period suffered an immediate market-adjusted de-
cline of almost ten percent on average, measured on the basis of the
stock's three-day price movement from the trading day before the an-
nouncement through the trading day after the announcement.56
From 1997 to 2002, restating firms lost over $100 billion in market
capitalization during this three-day trading period alone.57 Given
these significant and adverse stock price effects, it is implausible to
read the sharp increase in restatements at the end of the 1990s as the
product of any new tolerance for, or indifference to, restatements.
Perhaps, as some audit firms have argued, some portion of the change
can be attributed to recent SEC activism about "earnings manage-
ment,"5 8 which became an SEC priority as of 1998.59 But this explana-
tion does not seem capable of accounting for most, or even many, of
these restatements. Corporate issuers are not likely to voluntarily ex-
pose themselves to large stock price declines and potential securities
fraud liability simply to please the SEC; nor would the market react
53 Id.
54 Specifically, the median size by market capitalization of a restating company rose
from $143 million in 1997 to $351 million in 2002. Id.
55 Of the 125 accounting irregularity restatements identified through mid-2002, 85%
were listed on the Nasdaq and the NYSE. Id.
56 See id. at 5. The GAO Report also found a longer term market-adjusted decline of
18% over the period from sixty trading days before the announcement to sixty trading days
after the announcement. See id. at 29.
57 See id. at 28.
58 Accounting firms have attempted to explain this increase in restatements by noting
that the SEC tightened the definition of materiality in 1999. This explanation is not very
convincing, however, because the principal SEC statement that redefined materiality was
issued in mid-1999, one year after the number of restatements began to soar. See Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
211). Further, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 did not mandate restatements, but rather
advised that any standard practice employed by auditors and issuers that assumed amounts
under 5% were inherently immaterial could not be applied reflexively. See id. at 45,151.
59 The SEC's prioritization of earnings management as a principal enforcement tar-
get can be dated approximately to former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's speech on the
subject in 1998. See Levitt, supra note 25.
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with such surprise to "technical" or other modest accounting
adjustments.
Not only did the number of earnings restatements increase over
this period but the magnitude of the market reaction to these restate-
ments grew as well. 60 This suggests that during this period, managers
became progressively willing to take greater risks. Moreover, as the
1990s wore on, earnings restatements were increasingly issued by
large, mature, publicly held firms, rather than by smaller, less exper-
ienced companies. Managerial behavior within the largest firms,
therefore, appears to have changed over this period.
Data from the earlier noted GAO Report also supports this thesis
that managerial behavior changed. 6' Although there are many rea-
sons for a company to restate its financial statements (e.g., to adjust
costs or expenses or to recognize liabilities), one particular reason
drove the issuance of restatements during the period from 1997 to
2002. The GAO Report found that revenue recognition issues ac-
counted for almost thirty-eight percent of the 919 announced restate-
ments that it identified over the 1997 to 2002 period.62 In effect,
attempts by management to prematurely recognize income appear to
have been the most common cause of restatements. Earlier in the
decade, corporate management may have hid "excess earnings" in
"rainy day reserves" to smooth out undesired fluctuations in the firm's
earnings in order to minimize the appearance of volatility. By the end
of the decade, however, these same firms robbed future periods for
earnings they could immediately recognize. In short, "income
smoothing" gave way to increasingly predatory behavior.
Interestingly, during this period restatements involving revenue
recognition produced disproportionately large losses. 63 Seemingly,
the market especially feared revenue recognition restatements be-
cause they signaled that reported earnings could not be trusted.
Nonetheless, revenue recognition restatements remained the most
common form of restatement.64 Overall, the interests of management
and shareholders became increasingly misaligned, and gatekeepers
were caught in the middle.
60 According to Moriarty and Livingston, companies that restated earnings suffered
market losses of $17.7 billion in 1998, $24.2 billion in 1999, and $31.2 billion in 2000. See
Moriarty & Livingston, supra note 47, at 55. Expressed as a percentage of the overall capi-
talization (which ascended dramatically during this period), the market losses for 1998
through 2000 came to 0.13%, 0.14% and 0.19%, respectively.
61 See GAO Report, supra note 28, at 5.
62 See id. Revenue recognition was also the leading reason for restatements in each
individual year over this period. See id.
63 While revenue recognition restatements accounted for only 38% of restatements
over the 1997 to 2002 period, they were associated with $56 billion of the $100 billion in
market capitalization that restating companies lost during this period. See id. at 28.
64 See id. at 5.
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B. Security Analysts During the 1990s
The pattern of increasing auditor acquiescence in accounting ir-
regularities during the 1990s was not unique. Much the same pattern
can be discerned in the behavior of securities analysts over the same
period. Securities analysts were, if anything, more conflicted than au-
ditors. While much of the evidence here is anecdotal, it is striking
nonetheless.
As late as October 2001, shortly before Enron declared bank-
ruptcy, fifteen of the sixteen securities analysts covering the company
maintained "buy" or "strong buy" recommendations on its stock.65
Yet, months earlier, as of December 31, 2000, Enron already had a
stock price that was seventy times its earnings and six times its book
value. 66 Further, it had earned an eighty-nine percent return for the
year despite a nine percent decrease over the same period for the S&P
500 index. 67 Such a profile should have alerted any half-awake analyst
to the possibility that Enron was seriously overvalued. Yet the first bro-
kerage firm to downgrade Enron to a "sell" rating in 2001 was Pruden-
tial Securities, which did not engage at the time in investment
banking activities. 68 Prudential also had the highest proportion of sell
ratings among the stocks it evaluated. 69 Thus, even if Prudential also
woke up late, it is revealing that the least conflicted were the first to
awake.
How close then are the similarities between analysts and auditors?
Much like auditors, analysts are also "reputational intermediaries"
whose need to retain and please investment banking clients may often
dominate their desire to be perceived as credible and objective. One
statistic that inevitably arises in any assessment of analyst objectivity is
the curious fact that the ratio of "buy" to "sell" recommendations has
recently been as high as 100 to 1.70 In truth, this particular statistic
may not be as compelling as it initially sounds because there are obvi-
65 See The Watchdogs Didn't Bark: Enron and the Wall Street Analysts: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 5 (2002) (statement of Sen. Thompson); see also
The Fall of Enron: How Could it Have Happened?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 107th Cong. 119 (testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San
Diego School of Law) (testifving that "as late as October 2001 sixteen of seventeen of the
securities analysts covering Enron rated it a 'strong buy' or 'buy'").
66 See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. EcoN. PERSPS. 3
(2002).
67 See id.
68 See Lauren Young, Independence Day, SMARTMONEY, May 2002, at 28.
69 See id.
70 See Analyzing the Analysts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov't
Sponsored Enters. of the H.R Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 120 (2001) [hereinafter Ana-
lyzing the Analysts] (statement of Paul E. Kanjorski, Member, House Subcomm. on Capital
Mkts., Ins., & Gov't Sponsored Enters.) A study by First Call also found that less than 1%
of the 28,000 stock recommendations issued by brokerage firm analysts during late 1999
and most of 2000 were sell recommendations. See id.
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ous reasons why "buy" recommendations will normally outnumber
"sell" recommendations, even in the absence of conflicts of interest.71
A more revealing statistic shows the rapid shift in the ratio of "buy" to
"sell" recommendations that took place in the 1990s, which shift paral-
lels the earlier noted increase in accounting restatements during the
1990s. According to a study by First Call, the ratio of "buy" to "sell"
recommendations actually increased from 6 to 1 in the early 1990s to
100 to 1 by 2000.72 Again, it appears that something happened in the
1990s that compromised the independence and objectivity of the gate-
keepers on whom our private system of corporate governance de-
pends. 73  Even before Enron, the most sophisticated market
participants had come to understand the extent of these conflicts in
the case of analysts and had ceased to rely on "sell side" analysts.74
IV
EXPLAINING GATEKEEPER FAILURE
A pattern of mounting irregularity in financial reporting became
evident as the 1990s progressed. But what explains it? As a starting
point, none of the watchdogs that should have detected Enron's col-
lapse-auditors, analysts or debt rating agencies-did so before the
penultimate moment. Yet, considerable evidence was available that
should have alerted them to the pending collapse. 75 What plausible
hypothesis can explain the collective failure of the gatekeepers? Two
quite different, although complementary, hypotheses are available.
The first is the "general deterrence" hypothesis and the second is the
71 Sell-side analysts are employed by brokerage firms that understandably wish to max-
imize brokerage transactions. In this light, a buy recommendation addresses the entire
market and certainly all of the firm's customers, while a sell recommendation addresses
only those customers who own the stock (probably well under 1%) and those with margin
accounts who are willing to sell the stock short. In addition, sell recommendations annoy
not only the company that is adversely rated, but also institutional investors who fear that
sell recommendations will spook retail investors, causing them to panic and sell, while the
institution is locked into a large position that it cannot easily liquidate.
72 See Analyzing the Analysts, supra note 70, at 120.
73 Participants in the industry also report that the professional culture changed dra-
matically in the late 1990s, particularly as investment banking firms began to hire star ana-
lysts for their marketing clout. See Gretchen Morgenson, Requiem for an Honorable Profession,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 3, at 1 (suggesting that the change in research culture dates
from around 1996).
74 Although the empirical evidence is limited, research suggests that independent
analysts (i.e., analysts not associated with the underwriter for a particular issuer) behave
differently than, and tend to outperform in terms of accuracy, analysts associated with the
issuer's underwriter. The market in turn gave greater weight to the former's recommenda-
tions. See Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Under-
writer Analyst Recommendations, 12 REv. FIN. STUD. 653, 655-56 (1999).
75 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (noting that Enron was trading at
seventy times earnings and six times its book value and earned an 89% return for the year
2000). These are hallmarks of an overvalued company, and should serve to discourage
investment unless firm-specific information suggests continued strong earnings growth.
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"bubble" hypothesis. The first is essentially economic in its premises,
while the second is essentially psychological.
A. The Deterrence Explanation: The Under-deterred
Gatekeeper
The general deterrence hypothesis focuses on the decline in the
expected liability costs that faced auditors who were considering
whether or not to acquiesce in aggressive accounting policies favored
by managers. It postulates that, during the 1990s, the risk of auditor
liability declined, while the benefits associated with acquiescence in-
creased. As Economics 101 teaches, when both the costs go down and
the benefits associated with the activity go up, the output of the activ-
ity will increase. Here, the activity that increased was auditor
acquiescence.
Prior to the 1990s, auditors faced a very real risk of civil liability,
principally from class action litigation. 76 Why did the legal risks de-
crease during the 1990s? The obvious list of reasons includes:
(1) The Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Lampf Pleva, Liphind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberson,77 which significantly shortened the stat-
ute of limitations applicable to securities fraud;78
(2) the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,79 which eliminated private "aid-
ing and abetting" liability in securities fraud cases;80
(3) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),
which (a) raised the pleading standards for securities class actions to a
level well above that applicable to fraud actions generally;81 (b) substi-
76 See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 347 (1993) (statement of
Jake L. Netterville, Chairman, Board of Directors of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants) (noting that the six largest accounting firms' potential exposure to
loss was in the billions). One major auditing firm, Laventhol & Horwath, did fail as a result
of litigation and associated scandals growing out of the S&L scandals of the 1980s. See What
Role Should CPAs Be Playing in Audit Reform?, Partner's Report for CPA Firm Owners (Apr.
2002) (discussing the experience of Laventhol & Horwath). The accounting profession's
bitter experience with class action litigation in the 1980s and 1990s probably explains why
it became the strongest and most organized champion of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3).
77 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
78 See id. at 359-61 (creating a federal rule requiring plaintiffs to file within one year
of when they should have known of the violation underlying their action, but in no event
more than three years after the violation). This one to three year period was typically
shorter than the previously applicable limitations periods, which were determined by anal-
ogy to state statutes and often permitted a five or six year delay.
79 Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
80 See id. at 164.
81 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 § 101, 109
Stat. at 737-749.
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tuted proportionate liability for 'joint and several" liability; 2 (c) re-
stricted the sweep of the RICO statute so that it could no longer
convert securities fraud class actions for compensatory damages into
actions for treble damages; 3 and (d) adopted a very protective safe
harbor for forward-looking information; 4 and
(4) the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA), which abolished state court class actions alleging securities
fraud.8 5
Although the rapid succession of these developments prevents us
from calculating their individual impacts, their aggregate impact is
easily susceptible to measurement. Here, the available data appears to
show that the willingness of class action plaintiffs to sue secondary de-,
fendants declined during the latter half of the 1990s. Following the
passage of the PSLRA in 1995, the SEC undertook a study of the legis-
lation's apparent impact on securities litigation.86 As its baseline, the
SEC study began with the number of audit-related suits filed against
the then Big Six accounting firms from 1990 to 1992.87 For those
three years, the relevant numbers were 192, 172, and 141, respec-
tively.88 In 1996, however, the first year following the passage of the
PSLRA, the SEC found that, out of the 105 securities class actions filed
in that year, accounting firms were named in only six cases, corporate
counsel in zero cases, and underwriters in nineteen cases. 89 It thus
concluded that "[s] econdary defendants, such as accountants and law-
82 See id. § 201, 109 Stat. at 758-62.
83 See id. § 107, 109 Stat. at 758.
84 See id. § 102, 109 Stat. at 749-56.
85 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For an analysis and critique of this
statute, see generally Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
86 See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt
[hereinafter PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION ACT OF 1995].
87 The Big Six firms were Arthur Andersen LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst &
Young LLP, KPMG LLP, Price Waterhouse, and Coopers Lybrand. See In re IKON Office
Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 662 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002). The Big Six became the Big Five in
1998 when Price Waterhouse and Coopers Lybrand merged to form Price-
waterhouseCoopers. Id.
88 PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION ACT OF 1995, supra note 86, at
21-22. The figures for the years 1990 to 1992 were reported to the SEC by the Big Six and
include all class actions against them; thus, potentially some non-securities class actions
could be included in this total. Nonetheless, the number of such nonsecurities actions
seems likely to have been small. As the above SEC study further notes: "[D]uring the
period 1991 through June 1996, accountants were defendants in 52 reported settlements
(as opposed to complaints) .... and law firms were defendants in 7. Thus, there seems to
be a real decline in the number of lawsuits against secondary defendants." Id. at 22.
89 Id. at 21-22.
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yers, are being named much less frequently in securities class
actions."90
Not only did the threat of private enforcement decline, but the
prospect of public enforcement similarly subsided. In particular,
there is reason to believe that, from some point in the 1980s until the
late 1990s, the SEC shifted its enforcement focus away from actions
against the Big Five accounting firms towards other priorities.91 Al-
though reasonable persons can debate whether the judicial and legis-
lative shift towards deregulation in the 1990s was justified or
excessive, 92 the collective impact of these changes was to appreciably
reduce the risk of liability. Auditors were the special beneficiaries of
many of these provisions. For example, the pleading rules and the
new standard of proportionate liability protected them far more than
it did most corporate defendants.93 Thus, although auditors are still
sued today, the settlement value of cases against auditors has signifi-
cantly decreased. 94
90 Id. at 4. As this study expressly noted, both the PSLRA and the Supreme Court's
decision in Central Bank of Denver in 1994 that ended private "aiding and abetting" liability
under Rule IOb-5 could have caused this decline. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying
text.
91 Several former SEC officials, including Stanley Sporkin, the longtime former head
of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, have made this point to me. They believe that the
SEC's enforcement action against Arthur Andersen, which was resolved in June 2001, was
one of the very few (and perhaps the only) enforcement actions brought against a Big Five
accounting firm on fraud grounds during the 1990s. See SEC v. Arthur Andersen LLP, SEC
Litigation Release No. 17039 2001 SEC LEXIS 1159, (D.D.C.June 19, 2001). Although the
SEC did bring charges during the 1990s against individual partners in these firms, the high
cost and manpower required bring suits against the Big Five, and the expectation that
these defendants could zealously resist appears to have deterred the SEC from bringing
suits against them. In contrast, during the 1980s, especially during Mr. Sporkin's tenure as
head of the Enforcement Division, the SEC regularly brought enforcement actions against
the Big Five.
92 Indeed, this author would continue to support proportionate liability for auditors
on fairness grounds and agrees with the Second Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA's
heightened pleading standards. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that "the PSLRA imposed stringent procedural requirements on plaintiffs pursu-
ing private securities fraud actions").
93 At a minimum, plaintiffs today must plead with particularity those facts giving rise
to a "'strong inference of [fraudulent intent]."' See id. at 307. At the outset of a case, it
may be possible to plead such facts with respect to the management of the corporate de-
fendant (for example, based on insider sales by such persons prior to the public disclosure
of the adverse information that caused the stock drop), but it is rarely possible to plead
such information with respect to the auditors (who by law cannot own stock in their cli-
ent). In short, the plaintiff faces a "Catch 22" dilemma in suing the auditor in that it
cannot plead fraud with particularity until it obtains discovery and it cannot obtain discov-
ery under the PSLRA until it pleads fraud with particularity.
94 Although no systematic data exists, recent cases have noted that, after the enact-
ment of the PSLRA in 1995, the odds facing plaintiffs in class actions have climbed, partic-
ularly when they are suing secondary defendants. In particular, because the plaintiff is
obliged to prove "that a professional acted with knowledge and/or recklessness with regard
to material misstatements and omissions, a successful outcome can never be regarded as a
sure thing." See In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 269 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
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Correspondingly, the benefits of acquiescence to auditors rose
during the 1990s as the Big Five learned how to cross-sell consulting
services and to treat auditing services as a portal of entry into the lu-
crative client. Prior to the mid-1990s, few auditing firms provided sig-
nificant consulting services to audit clients. 95 Yet, according to one
recent survey, the typical large public corporation now pays its auditor
for consulting services three times what it pays for auditing services. 96
Not only did auditing firms see more profit potential in consulting
than in auditing, during the late 1990s, they also appeared to have
begun to compete based increasingly on a strategy of "low balling,"
under which they offered auditing services at rates ranging from mar-
ginal to below cost.97 The rationale for such a strategy was that the
auditing function was best viewed as a loss leader through which firms
could market more lucrative services. 98
The argument that the provision of consulting services to audit
clients eroded auditor independence is potentially subject to at least
one important rebuttal. Those who defend the propriety of consult-
ing services by auditors respond that the growth of such services made
little real difference because the audit firm was already conflicted by
Compare In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal
of securities class action against accountants in case where primary defendants had early
settled for $111 million), with In re Ikon Office Solutions Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (approving $111 million settlement by primary defendants). Wrhile there
have been some large settlements in the wake of Enron, see In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.,
194 F.R.D. 166, the SEC has also found that accountants today are less frequently named as
defendants. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
95 Consulting fees paid by audit clients exploded during the 1990s. According to the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness (the Panel), audit firms' fees from consulting services for
their SEC audit clients increased from 12% of gross fees in 1990 to 32% in 1999. See
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
112 (2000). For 1990, the Panel found that 79% of the Big Five firms' SEC audit clients
received no consulting services from their auditors, and only 1% of those clients paid con-
sulting fees exceeding their auditing fees. Id. Although the Panel found only marginal
changes during the 1990s, later studies have found that consulting fees for large public
corporations have become a multiple of the audit fee. See infta note 96 and accompanying
text.
96 A 2003 survey by the Chicago Tribune finds that the one hundred largest corpora-
tions in the Chicago area (determined on the basis of market capitalization) paid consult-
ing fees to their auditors that were, on average, over three times their audit fee. SeeJanet
Kidd Stewart & Andrew Countryman, Local Audit Conflicts Add Up: Consulting Deals, Hiring
Practices in Question, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2002, at C1. The most extreme example cited in
the study was Motorola, which had over a sixteen to one ratio between consulting fees and
audit fees. See id.
97 See Lee Berton, Audit Fees Fall as CPA Firms Jockey for Bids, WALL ST.J., Jan. 28, 1985,
at 33 (discussing low-balling in the United States); AndrewJack, The F500, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1994, at XLVI (discussing concerns about low-balling in the United Kingdom); Ann
Shortell & Ann Walmsley, Toughening Up the Books, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 10, 1986, at 48 (noting
low-balling in Canada).
98 See Berton, supra note 97, at 33.
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the fact that the client paid fees for auditing services. 99 Put as bluntly
as possible, the audit partner of a major client (such as Enron) has
virtually a "one-client" practice. The partner will likely need to find
employment elsewhere should he lose that client. In short, both crit-
ics and defenders of the status quo recognize that the desire to hold
the client can compromise the audit partner. 00 From this premise,
critics argue that a prophylactic rule prohibiting an auditing firm's
involvement in consulting seemingly achieves little, because the audi-
tor is already conflicted by the desire to receive fees.
Yet, even if this analysis is true to a degree, it overlooks the real-
world difficulty faced by the client who wishes to fire its auditor.
Under SEC rules, if a client fires an auditor or the auditor resigns
because of a dispute over accounting principles, public disclosure is
required. 10 1 To illustrate this point, let us suppose that a client be-
comes dissatisfied with an auditor who refuses to endorse the aggres-
sive accounting policy favored by its management. Firing the auditor
is an unattractive and costly step that invites potential public embar-
rassment and disclosure of the reasons for the auditor's dismissal or
resignation, as well as potential SEC intervention. If the auditor is also
a consultant to the client, however, the client can instead terminate
the auditor in its role as a consultant or at least reduce its use of the
firm's consulting services. This low visibility response neither requires
disclosure nor invites SEC oversight, but it creates incentives for the
audit firm to replace the intransigent partner. Thus, in effect, the
client can bribe or coerce the auditor in its core professional role by
raising or reducing its use of consulting services. As a result, the com-
bination of auditing and consulting services within a single profes-
sional firm gives the client a disciplinary tool with which to both
seduce and threaten the firm.
99 See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 89, 90 (1997); cf Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the
Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1399, 1436 (2000) (arguing that compensation-
related incentives undermine auditor independence).
100 For a review of the empirical literature on this point, see Robert A. Prentice, The
SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1597. 1648-49 (2000) ("Most knowledgeable observers seem to believe . . . that auditor
independence and objectivity are affected by auditors' self-interest in that, for example,
the more revenue coming from a client, the more the likely auditors are to give [in to]
client pressure for improper accounting treatment.") (footnote omitted).
1o The General Instructions of Form 8-K, and Item 4 ("Changes in Registrant's Certi-
fying Accountant") of Form 8-K, both found in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
require a reporting company to file a Form 8-K within five days after the resignation or
dismissal of the issuer's independent accountant or the independent accountant of a sig-
nificant subsidiary. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FORM 8-K, § B,
Item 4 (SEC 873, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/for8-k.pdf. The company
must then provide the elaborate disclosures mandated by Item 304 of Regulation S-K,
found in the Securities Act of 1933, relating to any dispute or disagreement between the
auditor and the accountant. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.304.
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Of course, the argument that the client can discipline and
threaten the auditor-consultant in ways that it could not discipline the
simple auditor relies more on logic than actual case histories. Yet it
does fit the available data. For example, a recent study by academic
accounting experts based on proxy statements filed during the first
half of 2001 finds that those firms that purchased more nonaudit ser-
vices from their auditor (as a percentage of the total fee paid to the
audit firm) were more likely to match the profile of a firm engaging in
earnings management. 10 2
B. The Irrational Market Story
Alternatively, Enron's and Arthur Andersen's downfalls, and the
host of other sudden stock declines in 2001 and 2002, can be seen as
the consequence of a classic bubble that overtook the equity markets
in the late 1990s and produced a market euphoria. Yet, what exactly
links a market bubble with gatekeeper failure? Arguably, the services
of gatekeepers become less relevant to investors in a bubble, and they
therefore experience a decline in both their leverage over their client
and the value of their reputational capital. As a result, in an atmos-
phere of market euphoria, because investors generally rely less on
gatekeepers, managers, in turn, regard them as more of a formality
than a necessity.
While this hypothesis may be impossible to rigorously prove, it
nonetheless seems consistent with modern behavioral economics.
Gatekeepers provide a critical service only when investors are cautious
and skeptical and therefore rely on the gatekeeper's services. Con-
versely, in a market bubble, investors largely abandon caution and
skepticism. In such an environment, companies continue to use audi-
tors because the SEC rules mandate it, or because no individual firm
wants the notoriety of being the first to dispense with them, rather
than because investors demand their use. As a result, gatekeepers
have less relevance and, consequently, reduced leverage with their cli-
ents. Accordingly, if we assume that euphoric investors will largely ig-
nore the auditor, the rational gatekeeper's best competitive strategy,
at least for the short term, is to become as acquiescent and low cost as
possible. Although this thesis assigns some causal responsibility to in-
vestors for their own losses, it does not absolve gatekeepers of respon-
sibility. Even if shareholders care little about the auditor's reputation,
102 See generally RICHARD M. FRANKEL ET AL., THE RELATION BETWEEN AUDITORS' FEES
FOR NoN-AUDIT SERVICES AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT (MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4330-
02, 2002) (providing empirical evidence on the relation between auditor fees and earnings
management), at http://www.ssrn.com/id=296557. Similarly, "firms purchasing more
[nonaudit] services were found more likely to just meet [or beat] analysts' expectations,"
which is the standard profile of the firm playing "the numbers game." See id. at 20.
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it is still possible for an auditor to intervene effectively and prevent
fraud by refusing to certify the issuer's financial statements, by with-
drawing its certificate on a later discovery of the fraud, or by notifying
the SEC.10 3
The key element in the foregoing explanation involves the reason
that investors ceased to care about the gatekeeper's reputation. After
all, the auditing profession arose out of investors' own concerns about
fraud and irregularity, not because of regulatory requirements. 10 4
What then caused this concern to weaken? Modern behavioral eco-
nomics supplies a plausible answer as it recognizes that individuals,
including investors, have "bounded rationality" and do not pursue all
information relevant to an optimal decision. 10 5 In particular, the
Nobel Prize-winning research of Professors Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky has demonstrated that individuals typically make deci-
sions by using heuristics-i.e., rules of thumb-rather than by incor-
porating and processing all obtainable information. 10 6 Professors
Kahneman and Tversky found that individuals pervasively use one
such rule of thumb-the "availability heuristic"' 0 7-that has special
relevance to the context of securities markets. The availability heuris-
tic asserts that individuals estimate the frequency of an event by recal-
ling recent instances of its occurring, even if, when viewed from a
longer-term perspective, these instances are normally rare or infre-
103 Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the auditor of a public
company to notify the SEC where the auditor discovers an "illegal act [that] has or may
have occurred," which "has a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer"
where management and the board of the issuer has not taken has not done so itself within
one day of notification by the auditor. See 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2000). Since its adoption in
1995 as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737, this provision has been seldom, if ever, employed.
104 The rise of the public accountant paralleled the rise of the publicly owned corpora-
tion, and was commensurate with the growing need of investors for objective financial
information. This growth preceded the adoption of the federal securities laws in the
1930s. For example, the American Association of Public Accountants was formed in 1887,
and in 1896, New York became the first state to certify public accountants who successfully
passed a required state exam. See JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFES-
SION: FROM TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL 1896-1936, at 2, 6-7, 43-45 (1969); see alsoJAMEs
DON Ev..arss, H,-5,eRy oF P,,OL,,AcUNII !N 'TE UI TEDf STATES~ (1960),
105 For overviews of behavioral economics, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-89 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Be-
havioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). Herbert Simon, a Nobel Prize
winner, coined the broadly accepted term "bounded rationality." SeeJolls et al., supra, at
1477; Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV.
pt. 2, at 1 (1978).
106 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982)
107 See id. at 11-14; see a/soJolls et al., supra note 105, at 1477-78 (applying the "availa-
bility heuristic" to the field of law and economics).
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quent.10 8 Hence, if the stock market has recently experienced ex-
traordinary returns, it becomes predictable that individuals will
overestimate the likelihood that such extraordinary gains will con-
tinue. 109 In effect, there is a status quo or persistence bias; investors
expect what has recently occurred to continue. As a result, when the
market soared in the early and mid-1990s, investors, operating on
heuristics, came to assume that this pattern would continue. 10
Thus, from the perspective of behavioral economics, bubbles are
not irrational moments of speculative excess or frenzy, but rather the
product of the predictable expectations of individuals who tend to as-
sume that whatever has recently occurred will persist. To trigger this
persistence bias, it is arguably only necessary that market returns have
in fact been extraordinary for a few successive years, possibly because
of real economic growth. This bias then causes investors to treat the
market phenomenon as normal and likely to continue. Such an ex-
planation also helps us understand why bubbles have reoccurred
throughout history. To explain bubbles, one need not posit that in-
vestors are inherently gullible, but only that investors suffer from nor-
mal heuristic biases, which are created by a period of extraordinary
market returns and which cause investors to expect such returns to
continue.
Such heuristic biases are not, of course, the whole story. For the
securities analyst, a market bubble presents a different and more seri-
ous challenge. During such times, those who recklessly predict ex-
traordinary returns will outperform those who are cautious and
prudent. Hence, in a bubble, extreme optimism for analysts becomes
less of a heuristic bias than a competitive necessity. Put bluntly, it is
dangerous to be sane in an insane world. As a result, the securities
analyst who prudently predicted reasonable growth and stock appreci-
ation during the 1990s was increasingly left in the dust by the invest-
ment guru who prophesized a new investment paradigm in which
revenues and costs were less important than the number of "hits" on a
website.
108 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 106, at 11.
109 This is by no means the only way to explain bubbles without resorting to claims of
mass delusion. An alternative theory is that institutional money managers have rational
incentives to engage in "herding behavior," preferring a common wrong decision to a
risky, correct one. See infra text and accompanying notes 123-27.
110 The deep-seated bias displayed by many individuals toward optimism in predicting
future events probably aggravated this trend. SeeJolls et al., supra note 105, at 1524-25
(noting that people tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than
to others); see generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERsoNALrrv & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806 passim (1980) (reporting the results of two studies that
investigated the tendency of people to be unrealistically optimistic about future life
events).
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Institutional factors compounded this problem. As the initial
public offering (IPO) market soared in the 1990s, securities analysts
became celebrities and valuable assets to their firms."' 1 Indeed, secur-
ities analysts became the principal means by which investment banks
competed for IPO clients, as the underwriter with the "star" analyst
could produce the greatest first day stock price spike in an IPO. 112 As
the salaries of such analysts soared, their compensation came increas-
ingly from the investment banking side of their firms. Hence, just as
in the case of the auditor, the analyst's economic position became
progressively more dependent on favoring the interests of persons
outside their profession-consultants in the case of the auditor and
investment bankers in the case of the analyst-who had little reason to
respect or observe the gatekeeper's professional standards or
culture. 113
Ultimately, as auditors increasingly sought consulting income and
as analysts became more dependent on an investment banking sub-
sidy, their common desire to preserve their reputational capital for
the long run became subordinated to their wish to obtain extraordi-
nary returns in the short run at the risk of that reputational capital.
The value of gatekeepers' reputational capital may have also declined
during the bubble as investors rationally reduced their reliance on
gatekeeping services because of their biased assumption that ex-
traordinary returns would persist. Under either hypothesis or both, it
111 For the view that investment banking firms changed their competitive strategies on
or around 1996 and thereafter sought the "popular, high-profile analyst" as a means of
acquiring IPO clients, see Morgenson, supra note 73, § 3, at 1 (citing Stefan D. Abrams,
chief investment officer for asset allocation at Trust Company of the West).
112 One court has recently even taken judicial notice of the conflicted role of star
securities analysts in landing IPOs for the investment banking firms that hired them away
from smaller competitors. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig.,
273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 383-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Judge Pollack quoted the Wall Street Journal,
the Boston Globe and other publications, stating: "'To bring a company public, a firm needs
its analyst on board. It is the analyst that explains-and implicitly, trumpets-the invest-
ment merits of the offering.'" Id. at 383. Judge Pollack also quoted an article which stated
that
analysts have become an important sales tool for the investment bankers to
land their super-profitable deals. A top analyst and the credibility that he
or she brings can be the difference between landing a deal or not-and the
pay for the most sought-after analysts can top $5 million a year.
Id. at 383-84 (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, the court cited the case of
Henry Blodgett, who according to press reports, was lured to Merrill Lynch with a high
salary in order to attract IPOs. Id. at 386 (citing Jon Birger, New Executive Henry Blodgett,
Merrill Lynch's Top Pick; Internet Analyst Lured from CIBC; On-Target Research Should Attract
IPOs, CRAiN's N. Y. Bus., Mar. 22, 1999, at 11).
113 The idea that persons outside of the profession began to dominate professional
gatekeeping is at the heart of a recent lawsuit initiated by the New York Attorney General
against five chief executive officers of major U.S. corporations. See Patrick McGeehan,
Spitzer Sues Executives of Telecom Companies Over 'Ill Gotten' Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at
Cl.
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may often have become profitable for firms to risk their reputational
capital by trading on it in the short-run, rather than by preserving it
for the long-run. Indeed, during the 1990s, to the extent that the
auditing function became a loss leader for multi-service accounting
firms eager to sell more lucrative consulting services and to the extent
that investment banking firms began to subsidize securities analysts,
each profession became less self-supporting and more dependent on
those who could profit from the liquidation of their reputational
capital.
C. Allocating Responsibility Among Gatekeepers, Managers and
Investors
The foregoing explanations still fail to explain fully the mecha-
nisms by which the gatekeepers sacrificed or liquidated their reputa-
tional capital, built up over decades, once the legal risks of doing so
declined or a bubble developed. Here, an allocation of responsibility
must be made among the various participants in corporate govern-
ance: managers, gatekeepers, and investors.
1. The Role of Managers
The pressure on gatekeepers to acquiesce in earnings manage-
ment was not constant over time, but rather accelerated during the
1990s as managerial incentives changed. As noted earlier, executive
compensation shifted during the 1990s from being primarily cash-
based to primarily equity-based.1 14 The clearest measure of this
change is the growth in stock options. Over the last decade, stock
options rose from five percent of shares outstanding at major U.S.
companies to fifteen percent, a three hundred percent increase. 11 5
The value of these options rose for the two thousand largest corpora-
tions by an even greater percentage, and over a dramatically shorter
period: from $50 billion in 1997 to $162 billion in 2000, an over three
hundred percent rise in three years. 116
Such stock options created an obvious and potentially perverse
incentive for managers to engage in short-term, rather than long-
term, stock price maximization because executives can exercise their
114 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
115 See Gretchen Morgenson, Bush Failed to Stress Need to Rein in Stock Options, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2002, at Cl [hereinafter Morgenson, Bush Failed]; Gretchen Morgenson,
Timefor Accountability at the Corporate Candy Store, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, § 3, at 1 [here-
inafter Morgenson, Time for Accountability].
116 See Morgenson, Bush Failed, supra note 115, at C7 (citing a study by Sanford C.
Bernstein & Co.). Thus, if $162 billion is the value of all options in these 2,000 companies,
aggressive accounting policies that temporarily raise stock prices by as little as 10% create a
potential gain for executives of over $16 billion, a substantial incentive.
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stock options and sell the underlying shares on the same day. 117 This
ability was itself the product of deregulatory reform in the early 1990s,
which relaxed the rules under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to permit officers and directors to exercise stock options and
sell the underlying shares without holding the shares for the previ-
ously required six month period. 118 Thus, if executives inflated the
stock price of their company through premature revenue recognition
or other classic earnings management techniques, they could quickly
bail out in the short-term by exercising their options and selling.
Shareholders were left to bear the cost when the inflated stock could
not maintain its price over subsequent periods. Given these incen-
tives, it became rational for corporate executives to use lucrative con-
sulting contracts, or other positive and negative incentives, to induce
gatekeepers to engage in conduct that assisted their short-term mar-
ket manipulations. As a result, the shift to stock options as the princi-
pal means of executive compensation, plus the removal of the legal
impediment to exercising and selling them simultaneously, placed
gatekeepers under greater pressure to acquiesce in short-term ori-
ented financial and accounting strategies.
2. The Role of Investors
Investors cannot fairly be presented as entirely innocent victims
in the recent epidemic of financial irregularities. During a bubble,
investors may ignore, or at least overly discount, gatekeepers' conflicts
of interest that might alarm investors in other circumstances. To be
sure, biased analyst research and overstated earnings likely misled
many investors, but investors also cheered on analysts who made the
most optimistic predictions and disdained those who were more cau-
tious. Even institutional investors, who own nearly fifty percent of the
equity securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange and account
117 A variety of commentators, calling for minimum holding periods or other curbs on
stock options, have made this point. These include Henry M. Paulson, Jr., chief executive
of Goldman Sachs, and Senator John McCain of Arizona. See David Leonhardt, Anger at
Executives' Profits Fuels Support for Stock Curb, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at Al.
118 Rule 16b-3(d) expressly permits an officer or director, otherwise subject to the
short-swing profit provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to
exercise a qualified stock option and sell the underlying shares immediately "if at least six
months elapse from the date of acquisition of the derivative security to the date of disposi-
tion of the ... underlying equity security." See 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-3(d) (2003). In 1991, the
SEC engaged in a comprehensive revision of its rules under Section 16(b) to facilitate the
use of stock options as executive compensation and to "reduce the regulatory burden"
under Section 16(b). See Ownership Reports, supra note 24, at 7243. A premise of this
reform was that "holding derivative securities is functionally equivalent to holding the un-
derlying equity security for purpose of section 16." Id. at 7248. Hence, the SEC permitted
the tacking of the option holding period onto the stock's holding period, thereby enabling
officers and directors to exercise options and sell on the same day, so long as they had
already held the option for six months.
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for approximately seventy-five percent of its daily trading volume,"19
overlooked or recklessly ignored abundant evidence that should have
alerted them. According to one estimate, at the peak of the market
bubble large institutional investors held sixty percent of Enron
stock. 120 Why didn't they see that Enron was overvalued, particularly
once alarm bells began to sound? The most plausible explanation for
the failure of institutional investors to respond to such signals begins
with the premise that professional money managers are rationally mo-
tivated by the desire to perform no worse than their major institu-
tional rivals. This pressure quickly leads to herding behavior. 12 1
According to this analysis, fund managers attract investor funds and
maximize their fees based on their "quarterly reported performance
relative to comparable funds or indices."'122
To illustrate, suppose that a hypothetical fund manager suspects
that Enron is overvalued. What should this manager do? If the man-
ager sells the fund's investment in Enron, the manager and the man-
ager's clients may do well, but only if the market agrees and Enron's
stock price falls that quarter. Conversely, if the market persists in
overvaluing Enron or actually climbs based on biased sell-side re-
search, the fund manager becomes an unfortunately premature
prophet and the manager's performance falls relative to rival manag-
ers. Hence, clients' funds flow out of the manager's account and into
the accounts of rival fund; the funds managed by our hypothetical
manager contract like an accordion. As a result, this manager may
not profit significantly even when Enron ultimately does fail.
In such an environment, there is little incentive to be ahead of
the crowd and considerable incentive to ride the bubble to its top in
order not to underperform rival investment managers with a similar
strategy. The result is a phenomenon known as "herding,"123 because,
by following the herd, the fund manager will not underperform most
of his rivals. Put differently, it is far worse to be individually wrong
than collectively wrong. The fund manager can survive mistakes that
others also make, as he can claim that the error was undetectable (i.e.,
"Who knew? Enron fooled us all!"). But the manager may suffer im-
mense injury when he makes correct decisions that the market only
119 SeeJames D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855 (2002).
120 See Healy & Palepu, supra note 66, at 22.
121 See id. at 26-27.
122 Id. at 26.
123 Professors David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein coined the term herding over a dec-
ade ago. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 Am.
ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1990). However, the concept long predates this term and is implicit
in Keynes's 1936 analysis of the stock market. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
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belatedly recognizes. In turn, this may explain why institutions fol-
lowed sell-side research that they knew to be biased during the bub-
ble. Anticipating that others would follow it also, institutional
investors took the safe course and followed the herd.1 24
3. The Role of Gatekeepers
This conclusion that even sophisticated investors will follow and
rely on sell-side research that they know to be biased brings us back to
the central role of gatekeepers. Up to a point, investors will follow
gatekeepers' advice even when they do not trust it because they expect
that such advice will influence the market. When the advice can no
longer move the market, however, the bubble bursts. Earlier this arti-
cle argued that gatekeepers performed poorly in the 1990s, at least in
the case of auditors and analysts, because they faced a reduced legal
threat and because they could increase their benefits by acquiescing
in managerial misbehavior. But there are further nuances regarding
the absence of competition and the principal-agent relationship that
also contributed to this story.
a. The Absence of Competition
The Big Five (now Big Four) accounting firms obviously domi-
nated a very concentrated market for auditing services.' 25 As a result,
smaller competitors could not expect to develop the international
scale or marketable brand names that the Big Four possessed simply
by quoting a cheaper price. Thus, high barriers chilled entry into this
market. More importantly, in a market this concentrated, implicit col-
lusion easily develops. For example, each of the Big Four could in
parallel develop and follow a common competitive strategy without
fear of being undercut by a major competitor. Under such condi-
tions, it would be rational for each of the Big Four firms to pursue a
strategy under which it acquiesced to clients' preferences for risky ac-
counting policies in order to obtain more lucrative consulting reve-
nues. The cost of such a strategy would be an occasional litigation loss
and some public humiliation, but this cost would be acceptable so
long as all of the Big Four firms behaved similarly. The costs of such a
policy would become prohibitive, however, if the firm was so humili-
ated that it stood out in contrast to a rival firm intent on marketing its
high integrity.
124 There is considerable evidence that fund managers do think in these terms. See
generallyJudith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 389, 416-20 (1999) (finding that younger fund managers hold less unsystematic risk
and have more conventional portfolios).
125 See Watts, supra note 44, at P6.
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Indeed, in a very concentrated market, collusion in any form is
not a necessary element in this explanation. Rather, in such a market,
it becomes more likely that every firm will incur some scandals and
will bear some litigation scars from highly public frauds and insolven-
cies. The only necessary assumption is that of high information costs:
namely, that investors will find it difficult to distinguish among these
firms, once all have been implicated in some scandals. In a less con-
centrated market, some dissident firm would predictably market itself
as distinctive for its integrity. In a market of just four firms, however,
this is much less likely.
b. Principal/Agent Problems
Auditing firms have always known that a large client could domi-
nate an individual partner in a manner that might inflict liability on
the firm. Thus, auditing firms were quick to develop internal moni-
toring systems that were far more elaborate than anything that law
firms have yet attempted. Yet, within the auditing firm, this internal
monitoring function is not all-powerful, because, in large part, this
function is not itself a profit center. Once firms added consulting ser-
vices as a major profit center, however, a natural coalition developed
between the individual audit partner and the consulting divisions;
each had a common interest in overruling the firm's internal monitor-
ing division when its prudential decisions would prove costly to them.
Finally, as the expected risk of liability fell during the 1990s, the influ-
ence of the internal monitoring staff logically declined
correspondingly.
Cementing the marriage between the audit partner and the con-
sulting division was the use of incentive fees. For example, if the inter-
nal division providing software consulting services for an accounting
firm offered the principal audit partner an incentive fee of one per-
cent of any contract sold to the partner's audit client, the audit part-
ner would have an enhanced reason to acquiesce in risky accounting
policies. Under the software consulting contract, the audit partner
might receive as much or more compensation from incentive fees for
cross-selling as from auditing fees, and thus the partner would have
even more reason to value his client's satisfaction above his interest in
the firm's reputational capital. More importantly, the audit partner
also acquires an ally in the consultants, who similarly would want to
ensure that they satisfied their mutual client. Together, the audit
partner and the consultants would form a coalition that was poten-
tially able to override the protests of their firm's internal monitoring
unit. While case histories matching this exact pattern have not yet
come to light, abundant evidence suggests that incentive fees can bias
2004]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:269
audit decisionmaking.1 26 Interestingly, Enron itself presents a fact
pattern in which the audit firm's on-the-scene quality control officer
was overruled and replaced. 127
V
IMPLICATIONS: EVALUATING CONGRESS'S RESPONSE
This Article has presented a variety of explanations for the corpo-
rate governance failures of 2001 and 2002: (1) uncontrolled equity
compensation that motivated executives to manipulate the market;
(2) inadequate deterrence of gatekeepers; and (3) a broader phe-
nomenon of a market bubble that implicates investors as well as gate-
keepers. Which of the foregoing theories is most persuasive? Does it
matter? Although they are complementary rather than contradictory,
their relative plausibility bears on what reforms are most necessary or
desirable. For example, the more one accepts the deterrence expla-
nation, the more one might favor legislative changes aimed at restor-
ing an adequate legal threat. In principle, these changes could either
raise the costs or lower the benefits of acquiescence to auditors. Alter-
natively, to the extent one accepts the bubble hypothesis, the problem
may be self-correcting; once the bubble bursts, gatekeepers may come
back into fashion, as investors become skeptics and once again de-
mand assurances that only credible reputational intermediaries can
provide. 128 Of course, not all gatekeepers are alike. Thus, it may be
126 One of the most notable recent accounting scandals involved the Phar-Mor chain
of retail stores. There, an audit partner for Coopers & Lybrand was denied participation in
profit sharing because he had insufficiently cross-sold the firm's services. The next year he
sold $900,000 worth of business-most of it to Phar-Mor and its affiliates-but subse-
quently failed to detect $985 million in inflated earnings by Phar-Mor over the following
three years. See Bazerman et al., supra note 99, at 89; Prentice, supra note 38, at 184.
127 Carl E. Bass, an internal audit partner, warned other Andersen partners in 1999 of
Enron's dangerous accounting practices. See Robert Manor & Jon Yates, Faceless Andersen
Partner in Spotlight's Glare, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2002, § 5, at 1. One Enron-related lawsuit
alleged that David Duncan, the Andersen partner in charge of the Enron account, joined
with Enron executives to have Mr. Bass removed from the Enron account within a few
weeks of his warning. See id. This evidence suggests, if nothing else, that executives of a
Big Five firm could overcome the internal audit function when the prospective consulting
fees were high enough.
128 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has indeed suggested that market cor-
rections will largely solve the problems uncovered in the wake of Enron. See Alan Green-
span, Corporate Governance, Remarks at the Stern School of Business, New York
University (Mar. 26, 2002), www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/2002032
62/default.htm. In his view, earnings management came to dominate management's
agenda and as a result, "it is not surprising that since 1998 earnings restatements have
proliferated." Id. Greenspan further stated that "[tihis situation is a far cry from earlier
decades when, if my recollection serves me correctly, firms competed on the basis of which
one had the most conservative set of books. Short-term stock price values then seemed less
of a focus than maintaining unquestioned credit worthiness." Id. He goes on to suggest
that: "[a] change in behavior, however, may already be in train." Id. Specifically, he finds
that "perceptions of the reliability of firms' financial statements are increasingly reflected
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that the deterrence solution works better for auditors, while analysts
would benefit more from structural reforms aimed at increasing their
independence.
129
Viewed historically, the Enron crisis is only one of several modem
accounting crises, extending from the Penn Central crisis in the 1970s
to the S&L crisis in the 1980s. 130 The distinctive difference between
the Enron crisis and the crises of the 1970s and the 1980s, however, is
that in those eras only insolvency threatened management with
ouster.13' Thus, management in those earlier crises had a strong in-
centive to "cook the books" only as their corporation approached in-
solvency. Today, as the mechanisms of corporate accountability-
takeovers, control contests, institutional activism, and more aggressive
boards-have shortened management's margin for error, the incen-
tive to engage in earnings management and accounting irregularities
is much greater. Although the increasingly competitive business envi-
ronment makes management's survival less certain, the instant wealth
promised by stock options also gives rise to an incentive to cheat, even
when management's survival is not in question. Together, the fear of
ouster and the temptation of instant wealth increase the likelihood of
fraud.
A. Congress's Response: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Passed almost without dissent, the Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, popularly known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, essentially addresses the problem of accounting
irregularities by shifting control of the auditing profession from the
profession itself to a new body, the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board (the Board). 32 Conceptually, this is a familiar approach,
in yield spreads on corporate bonds" and that other signs of self-correction are discernible.
lM.
129 This would certainly seem to be the premise of the recent "global settlement" be-
tween the SEC, the New York Attorney General, and the major underwriting firms, as its
principal focus is on structural relief that will increase the professional independence of
securities analysts. See Stephen Labaton, 10 Wall Street Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst In-
quiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at Al.
130 For an overview of these crises, see Cunningham, supra note 28; supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
131 As noted earlier, the takeover became a mechanism that could threaten managers
at large public corporations with ouster only after or in conjunction with the development
ofjunk bonds, which were first used to finance a hostile takeover in 1983. See supra note 14
and accompanying text. In contrast, the S&L crisis of the 1980s was distinctive in that the
S&Ls did not typically trade in liquid public markets; rather, control was transferred by the
sale of control blocks. Hence, a controlling shareholder was by definition immune from a
takeover and thus could only be threatened with ouster by the approach of insolvency.
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2003). Section 101(c) of the Act enumerates the broad
powers of the Board, including the authority to "establish .. .auditing, quality control,
ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for
issuers .... Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(c), 116 Stat. 745.
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as the Board's authority largely parallels that of the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) over securities brokers and deal-
ers.133 What is new, however, is that the Act explicitly recognizes the
significance of conflicts of interest, as it bars auditors from providing a
number of categories of professional services to their audit clients and
authorizes the Board to prohibit additional categories of services if
necessary.13 4 Thus, to the extent that conflicts of interest compro-
mised auditors, the Act responds with an appropriate answer.
There is less reason for optimism, however, if accounting irregu-
larities stem from a lack of general deterrence or the increased incen-
tive of corporate executives to "cook the books" to maximize the value
of their stock options. The Act simply fails to address these problems.
For example, the Act neither revises the PSLRA (except in a minor
way) ,135 nor does it make gatekeepers who knowingly aided and abet-
ted a securities fraud liable to investors in private litigation. Finally,
the Act never addresses stock options or executive compensation, ex-
cept to the extent that it may require the forfeiture of such compensa-
tion to the corporation if the corporation later restates its earnings.1 36
In short, while the potential benefits from acquiescing in accounting
irregularities appear to have been reduced for auditors, the expected
costs to gatekeepers from accounting irregularities seemingly remains
low because the level of deterrence that they once faced has not been
restored.137
This same critique applies with even greater force to the recent
efforts of the NYSE and Nasdaq to reform their listing standards. Af-
133 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (regarding the creation and activities of registered securities
associations).
134 Section 201 of the Act, amending § 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
specifies eight types of professional services which the auditor may not perform for an
audit client and authorizes the Board to prohibit additional services if it determines that
they may compromise auditor independence. See§ 201 (a), 116 Stat. at 771-72 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7231).
135 Note, however, that section 804 of the Act does extend the statute of limitation for
securities fraud suits, thereby reversing a 1991 Supreme Court decision that shortened the
time period. See id. § 804, at 801 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658) (setting the statute of
limitations for securities fraud); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbert-
son. 501 U.S. .50..3959-61 (19l1) t,-reatig the frmr fede-rl rl- requiring plaintiffs to
file within one year of when they should have known of a particular securties violation
underlying their action, but in no event more than three years after the violation).
136 Section 304 of the Act requires the forfeiture of certain bonuses "or other incen-
tive-based or equity-based compensation" and any stock trading profits received by a chief
executive officer or chief financial officer of an issuer during the twelve-month period
following the filing of an inflated earnings report that is later restated. See § 304, 116 Stat.
at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243). This does cancel the incentive to inflate earnings
and then bail out, but ambiguities abound as the enforcement methods applicable to this
provision are unspecified and the provision applies only if the earnings restatement is the
product of "misconduct." See id.
137 Prior to the 1990s, private litigation was a genuine and arguably an excessive con-
straining force on auditors. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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ter much study, both bodies have proposed new independence stan-
dards that will require listed companies to have both majority
independent boards and entirely independent audit, nominating, and
compensation committees, and to utilize a tighter definition of inde-
pendence. 138 Although such reforms and heightened independence
requirements seem desirable, it does not appear that they would have
affected the boards of Enron or WorldCom. 13 9 Nor does enhanced
independence for board members sound like the most appropriate
response if the deeper problem, as this Article has suggested, is gate-
keeper failure.
Thus, from this article's perspective, a relevant public policy
agenda should address three goals that Sarbanes-Oxley failed to ad-
dress: (1) increasing the legal threat to deter sufficiently gatekeeper
acquiescence in managerial fraud; (2) reducing the perverse incen-
tives created by the unconstrained use of stock options; and (3) ad-
dressing the structural conflicts that cause herding, analyst bias, and
an excessive market bias towards optimism.
B. The Unused Lever: Shareholder Power
Initially, let us assume that the most difficult issue left by
Sarbanes-Oxley involves the misaligned incentives of managers,
caused by the sudden shift in the form of executive compensation
during the 1990s. This is a fair premise because other problems, such
as the need for greater deterrence, can be addressed by any of several
means. For example, Congress could restore private aiding and abet-
ting liability, thereby overruling Central Bank of Denver,140 and increas-
ing the expected costs to gatekeepers of acquiescence in financial
irregularity. Such a reform may be unlikely in the current political
environment, but it poses no conceptual problem.
In contrast, reforming executive compensation poses a more seri-
ous conceptual challenge. Why? The short answer is that neither
Congress nor the SEC can legislate or formulate optimal executive
compensation rules for all publicly held companies. One size simply
does not fit all. What works for a dot-coin company does not work for
a public utility, and vice versa. Who then could propose and imple-
138 For a brief overview of these reforms, see Amy Borrus et al., Reform: Business Gets
Religion, Bus. WK, Feb. 3, 2003, at 40, 41 (noting that corporations have adopted these
reforms with little resistance, but also noting that some "governance gurus fear that compa-
nies are checking the boxes rather than taking changes to heart").
139 Ironically, one survey by Yale School of Management Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld
has found that when it comes to the standard measures of good governance-the indepen-
dence, attendance, and financial acumen of directors-the "least admired" companies do
about as well as the "most admired" companies. SeeJerry Useem, From Heroes to Goats and
Back Again? How Corporate Leaders Lost Our Trust, FORTUNE, Nov. 18, 2002, at 40, 48.
140 See 511 U.S. 164, 164 (1994).
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ment more specific reforms? One answer is the board of directors.
Yet one has to be an extreme optimist to expect activism from boards
on this issue. Boards are populated by fellow CEOs, who are not likely
to be excited about restricting executive compensation or their own
liquidity.
Thus, the more practical answer is to encourage institutional in-
vestors to address this problem. This year shareholders placed a re-
cord number of proposals on corporate proxy statements for a
shareholder vote at corporations' annual meetings.1 41 The majority of
these proposals dealt with executive compensation. 142 These proposi-
tions, however, are generally only precatory and can be ignored by
managers. 143 Missing, therefore, is some next step that shareholders
can take when a proposal receives majority support at the annual
shareholder meeting and yet management ignores it. In theory,
shareholders could commence a proxy contest, but the costs are pro-
hibitive and the problems of shareholder collective action are
considerable. 144
What else could be done? Institutional shareholders have a pre-
ferred answer: they want to be able to nominate one or more minority
directors on the corporation's own proxy statement in order to econo-
mize on the costs of shareholder activism. The SEC has begun to
study this proposal, 145 but the business community is actively organiz-
141 See Terry Gallagher, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: One Year Later, CORP. GoVERN-
ANCE ADVISOR, July-Aug. 2003, at 18.
142 * See id. (noting that "[m]ore than 50 percent of the record number of shareholder
proposals during this proxy season dealt with executive compensation issues").
143 Most state statutes permit shareholders to amend the bylaws of the corporation.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2003) (providing that "[a]fter a corporation has
received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall
be in the stockholders entitled to vote"). This power, however, conflicts with the universal
provision, which most states have adopted, giving the board of directors control of the
business and affairs of the corporation. See, e.g., id. § 141 (a) (providing that the "business
and affairs of every corporation organized ... shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors"). The law in this area remains unsettled. See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Con-
tests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605 (1997) (discussing legal theories in connection with the
questions raised by the allocation of power between boards and shareholders). For con-
trasting recent decisions, compare International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fem-
ing Cos., 975 P.2d 907, 908 (Okla. 1999) (upholding a bylaw adopted by shareholders
against the claim that it impermissibly invaded the authority accorded to the board under
Oklahoma law), with Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1582
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (invalidating a mandatory bylaw adopted by a shareholder because it in-
vaded the authority given to board under Georgia law).
144 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1080-81 (1990) (discussing the collective ac-
tion problem in context of shareholder voting).
145 See Notice of Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,778, 68 Fed. Reg. 24530 (May 1, 2003) (soliciting
public comment regarding revisions to rules relating to shareholder proposals and director
nomination processes). On July 15, 2003, the SEC's staff indicated that it would propose
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ing against it."46 Its central attraction is that it gives shareholders a
next step, without threatening a full scale control contest, if manage-
ment ignores their proxy proposal. If adopted, its real impact would
not be a spate of minority directors suddenly elected to boards, but
rather a significant number of negotiations between institutional
shareholders and corporate managers over specific executive compen-
sation issues. In effect, enhanced shareholder rights to nominate
board members may be the procedural solution to the substantive
problem of reforming executive compensation.
C. Curbing Excessive Optimism
Earlier, this Article noted that serious principal-agent problems
compromise the effectiveness of fund managers. 14 7 Therefore, if
stock prices tend to be systematically inflated by biased research and if
fund managers are reluctant to combat such inflation, a different
champion must be found to bring the market back into equilibrium.
In an unregulated market, that natural champion would be the short
seller. Under U.S. securities laws, however, the short seller is disfa-
vored and heavily regulated. 48 Relaxing these regulations, while not
politically popular, would be one way of creating a countervailing
force to those that inflate stock prices. Ironically, in this particular
regard, deregulation-that is, deregulation of the short seller-might
be a legitimate response to Enron.149
changes in its proxy rules in order to facilitate direct shareholder nomination of "watch-
dog" directors under some circumstances. See Div. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION
OF DIRECTORS 30-31 (2003).
146 See Phyllis Plitch & Lynn Cowan, Investors, Stirred Up by Scandals, Rally for Corporate
Democracy, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2003.
147 See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
148 Increasing economic evidence suggests that short sale constraints can cause stocks
to be overvalued. See generally Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints
and Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2002) (presenting a study of the costs of short
selling stock). The best known of the legal constraints on short selling is the up-tick rule,
which permits short sales only at a price higher than the previous price (an up-tick) or at
the previous price if the last different price was lower. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2003).
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13091 outlines the purposes of the up-tick rule. See
Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,091, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,535
(Dec. 28, 1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1). Today, the advent of decimalization of
securities prices has weakened the impact of the up-tick rule. Further, recent commenta-
tors have argued that the tax laws impose the primary constraints on short selling. See, e.g.,
Michael Powers et al., Market Bubbles, Wasteful Avoidance, and Tax and Regulatory Con-
straints on Short Sales (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (detailing
both tax and regulatory constraints on short selling).
149 The SEC has recently shown some willingness to reconsider and liberalize its rules
regarding short sales. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48709, 2003 SEC LEXIS
2594 (Oct. 28, 2003). In that Release, the SEC has proposed a new Regulation SHO that
would permit short sales to be effected at a price one cent below the consolidated best bid;
however, the Release would also tighten the restrictions on "naked" short sales. Thus, its
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CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed several different explanations for the
surge in financial irregularities in the late 1990s. Chief among these
are:
1. The Gatekeeper Explanation. Professional "reputational in-
termediaries" faced less legal risk and had more reason to defer to
their clients as the 1990s wore on. This combination of increased
market incentives and legal deregulation may explain why auditors ac-
quiesced and analysts became more biased, but it cannot stand alone
as a comprehensive explanation. One still needs some further expla-
nation of why managers and underwriters became more interested in
bribing their gatekeepers than they were in the past.
2. The Executive Compensation Explanation. As executive compen-
sation changed during the 1990s, it increased the incentive for manag-
ers to inflate earnings, even if the resulting stock prices were not
sustainable, because management could bail out ahead of their share-
holders. This explanation accounts for the increased incentive on the
part of managers to induce gatekeepers to acquiesce in aggressive ac-
counting. In particular, the fact that the plurality of financial state-
ment restatements in the late 1990s involved revenue recognition
issues supports this explanation. 150 Still, it must be stressed that the
real problem here is not equity compensation, or even excessive com-
pensation, but rather excessive liquidity that allows managers to bail
out at will. Only firm-specific answers, such as holding periods and
retention ratios, seem likely to work effectively to solve this problem.
3. The Herding and Investor Bias Explanations. These explanations
can help account for the market myopia underlying a bubble, but they
lack quantitative support. Although it can be asserted that individual
investors expect extraordinary returns to persist, this hypothesis is less
credible when applied to institutions. Still, fund managers have their
own reasons to herd and persist in buying stocks they consider over-
valued. Ultimately, they fear being individually wrong much more
than being collectively wrong, and this bias inclined them to "ride the
actual provisions may have offsetting effects. More importanly, SEC proposed in this Re-
lease to relax its short sale rules for certain liquid securities for a two-year pilot period in
order to test the effects of less regulated short selling on market volatility, price efficiency,
and liquidity. Although these proposals do not appear to be Enron-related, the fact re-
mains that the short seller should be as motivated to serve as a private attorney general,
eagerly seeking to detect fraud, as the plaintiffs attorney.
In recommending some relaxation of the constraints on the short seller, this author
does not mean to suggest that the prohibition against market manipulation should be
relaxed, but only that the more prophylactic rules, such as the up-tick rule, should be
revised, and that tax penalties should be eased.
150 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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bubble." As a result, the market did not respond to available evidence
of overvaluation.
If weight is accorded to any of these explanations, then it be-
comes clear that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while useful, still addresses
only one aspect of the first explanation for gatekeeper failure by curb-
ing the ability of managers to seduce auditors with consulting income.
A more relevant public policy agenda should also: (1) increase the
legal threat to deter acquiescence in managerial fraud; (2) reduce the
perverse incentives created by the unconstrained use of stock options;
and (3) address the structural conflicts that cause herding, analyst
bias, and an excessive market bias towards optimism. As discussed,
enhanced shareholder rights to nominate board members may be the
best procedural solution to the substantive problem of reforming ex-
ecutive compensation. Furthermore, deregulation of the short seller
may be the most direct means to combat stock price inflation. Cur-
rently, however, these issues have gone unaddressed. Thus, to con-
clude, one can only paraphrase George Santayana: those who ignore
conflicts of interest are destined to repeat history, cycle after cycle. 51
151 See GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LiiE OF REASON; OR, THE PHASES OF HuMAN PROGRESS
284 (1st ed. New York Charles Scribner's Sons 1905).
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